The paper engages with the issue of emergency regimes in Cameroon and compliance with the international standards on that matter. Emergency regimes which entail human rights violation and infringement of the rule of law have become over the years an essential technique of government in Cameroon. Authorities are inclined to invoke such regimes more in times of democratic competition than in times of real external threat. Emergency regimes being organised by a set of international instruments mainly from a treaty based system, the study focuses on the scale of compliance of the Cameroon emergency system with such international standards. These standards amount to a set of principles that states should comply with when confronted to emergency situations. For example, the UN Charter compels state parties to respect and protect human rights in all circumstances. Cameroon being subject to international law and to its international commitments towards state and non-state actors, this paper questions whether emergency regimes as currently designed in the country are mere derogations or failures of law.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the international legal standards on emergency regimes and assess how much the Cameroon emergency system complies with them. There are a variety of international materials guiding emergency regimes and some of them amount to a set of soft laws and recommendations by experts and organisations.
1 Without denying the relevance of such materials, my main concern in this paper is to focus essentially on international provisions especially those from a treaty based system that are binding and compulsory among states. The concept of emergency regimes refers to a state of emergency, a state of exception and a state of siege. They are generally brought into being following exceptional circumstances such as war, insurrection, invasion and, general disorder threatening the existence of the state. The United
Nations coined some events that may lead up to the enforcement of emergency regimes as follows:
International conflict, war, invasion, defence or security of the state or parts of the country; civil war, rebellion, insurrection, subversion, or harmful activities of counterrevolutionary elements; disturbances of peace, public order or safety; danger to the constitution and authorities created by it; natural or public calamity or disaster; danger to the economic life of the country or parts of it; maintenance of essential supplies and services for the community (UN Commission on Human Rights 1962:257).
The enforcement of emergency regimes vests the government with special powers and allows for the possibility to rule by decrees, establish curfews, restrict the movement of person and property to administrative permission, arrests without warrant and monitor meeting and publication. The raison d"etre of these regimes is therefore to protect and guarantee the existence of the state through the suspension of law. However, owing to various abuses that they may bring about, these regimes are strictly regulated under international law. My assumption is that even though
Cameroon is subject to international law, the country does not comply with its regulations when it comes to enforce a state of emergency or a state of exception. My starting point in this discussion is to place the Cameroon emergency system side by side with the international legal standards on emergencies and examine the level of compatibility among the two. In so doing my natural cataclysm such as the repeated volcanic eruptions (1959, 1982, 1989, 1999, and 2000) framed by section 9 of the constitution which reads:
(1) The President of the Republic may, where circumstances so warrant, declare by decree a state of emergency which shall confer upon him such special powers as may be provided for by law.
(2) In the event of a serious threat to the nation's territorial integrity or to its existence, its independence or institutions, the President of the Republic may declare a state of siege by decree and take any measures as he may deem necessary. He shall inform the Nation of his decision by message.
If these regimes are to be enforced in serious exceptional circumstances and should be subject to time and space limitation, it has not been always the case in Cameroon where they are usually brought to existence to impair the democratic game and protect the ruling class in power.
Following these abuses, a particular attention is being paid to emergency regimes which are currently subject to a strict regulation by various international instruments. The United Nations
Economic and Social Council consider these regimes to be mere derogations and prescribe that they should not happen in a legal vacuum (UN ECOSOC 1984: para.61 9). As a result, a set of rules that state-parties should comply with when confronted to emergency situations has been set out most importantly from a treaty based system. These rules entrenched in certain international 6 6 instruments are compulsory among state-parties and include the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Labour Organisation and the Convention against Torture.
The ceaseless resort to draconian measures by authorities in Cameroon since its inception has negatively effect and shaped the current state"s structures to the extent that the crisis situation has merged with normality. This situation can be explained not only by a lack of freedoms and democracy but also by the tied control of the regime over a population completely anaesthetized by the repressive machinery that characterises authoritarian and totalitarian states. Yet this does not change the fact that being a fully-fledged protagonist in the international arena, Cameroon remains subject not only to international law, but also to its international commitments towards states and non-state parties. It is the meaning of the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda which is to say agreements and clauses between parties to a contract must be observed. In addition, the Constitution of Cameroon provides for the predominance of the provisions of international treaties over domestic legislation. Section 45 of the supreme law provides that "duly approved or ratified treaties and international agreements shall, following their publication, override national laws, provided the other party implements the said treaty or agreement."
Looking at the above developments one question arises:
To what extend does the institution of emergency regimes in Cameroon comply with the international standards on that matter?
In order to determine in light of the international standards whether emergency regimes as currently designed within the Cameroon context mere derogations or failures of law, I firstly account for the theoretical approach to emergency regimes. Secondly I proceed by assessing the international standards through the lenses of Cameroon experience and thirdly I provide some suggestions.
Theoretical approach to emergency regimes: the normative approach
The normative approach to emergency regimes is the one that include these regimes within the realm of law and affirm their compatibility with the doctrine of constitutional democracy. There are various approaches to the doctrine of emergency and I chose to discuss the normative approach for the ideas developed by this approach are in line with the requirements prescribed by international law. According to the normative approach, emergency regimes should be 7 7 considered as an entire part of the legal sphere. The approach departs from the popular conception which considers emergency regimes to be the business of the executive only. It further argues that these regimes being part and parcel of the legal order are also from the spheres of the legislature and judiciary.
On the first point or the stand that a state of emergency is an executive affair, proponents of the normative approach consider such a situation to be a constitutional dictatorship. The tenants of this conception that include Clinton Rossiter (Rossiter 1948), claim that liberal democracy is complex, heavy and designed to function under normal circumstances and peaceful conditions. Accordingly, it is not adaptable to crisis periods which require celerity. Therefore, emergency regimes as constitutional dictatorship imply that drastic measures enforced by modern democracies in time of turmoil should be considered as part and parcel of the democratic process. According to Rossiter, the striking power of autocracy has many times been used to preserve democracy, and more than one constitution has been suspended so that it might not be permanently destroyed. The author went on to argue as follows:
Those republics which in time of danger cannot resort to a dictatorship will generally be ruined when grave occasions occur (Rossiter 1948: Title page).
On the second point or the view that emergency regimes are from the domain of the legislature, the normative approach stresses the necessity of parliamentary involvement in time of crisis. The argument was developed in Albert Dicey"s legality approach (Dicey 1959:246) . The author states that in time of turmoil, priority should be given to parliament which remains the only authority to give carte blanche to officials/executive when dealing with a threat. According to him:
If a sudden emergency arise, e.g. through the outbreak of an insurrection, or an invasion by a foreign power, the ministry ought, if they require additional authority, at once to have parliament convened and obtain any powers which they may need for the protection of the country (Dicey 1959:246) .
However, further reading between Dicey"s lines reveals a flexibility of the role granted to parliament. In this respect, when there is not enough time to obtain an act of parliament, ministers ought to take every step, even at the peril of breaking the law, which is necessary either 8 8 for restoring order or for repelling attack, and must rely for protection on parliament passing an Act of Indemnity (Dicey 1959:246) .
On the third point or the view that the judiciary is an authority in emergency regimes, the normative approach emphasises the vital place of judges in the management of crisis. The idea is echoes by David Dyzhenaus who rejects all approaches to emergency regimes which rely essentially on the suspension of law and the use of draconian measures by the executive power.
Legality or the rule of law provides a legal constitution which is the basis of the authority of those who have power to make law. If they should stray outside the limits of that authority, they lack not only legal authority, but also any authority at all (Dyzhenaus 2008: 35) . Therefore, Such an act, which is characterised by political motive is above the competence of judges and therefore is not subject to judicial review. Along with the threshold of severity, the principle of proportionality is the most important and yet most elusive of the substantive limits imposed on the privilege of derogation (Fitspatrick 1994: 60) .
The principle of proportionality means that a declaration of a state of emergency would be illegal in a situation where ordinary legislation could bring adequate solutions to the crisis. In other does not specify whether the competence of the minister applies only in the area subject to a state of emergency or outside that area. In any case, nothing prevents him from extending the effects of a state of emergency in areas that originally were not included in the presidential decree of declaration.
The failure of Cameroon emergency legislation in relation to the principle of proportionality is a fact. In various occasions, even though the threat to the life of the nation was not evident the ordinary legal framework has been silenced not for the sake of protecting human rights and the rule of law but to guarantee the survival of the regime. For example, the year 2008 was marked by a global financial crisis resulting in inflation and international uprisings. In Cameroon two events emerged: the general inflation that led to what has been labelled "hunger"s riots" and a governmental bill regarding the constitutional amendment of the section that prevented President Biya in power since 1982 to run for another term. In February of that year several people peacefully demonstrated in the streets to express their disagreement. In retaliation a de facto emergency was enforced and the army was brought in to restore "peace" and "order". As a result, more than one hundred and thirty-nine people were gunned down according to a report by the National Committee of Human Rights, hundreds more according to NGOs. The situation clearly accounts for the use of draconian measures by the regimes to guarantee its own survival. The meaning "exceptional threat" may vary from one country to another. The Geneva Convention refers to this concept as "internal conflict" or "war without international character"
and it denotes the seriousness and the level of gravity of a situation which may lead up to the declaration of a state of emergency or a state of siege. Accordingly, minor disturbances cannot justify the enforcement of a state of emergency and human rights restriction under the pretext of saving the state. More important, the concept of "state" should be understood from a constitutional law perspective. According to this discipline, the state refers to a group of individuals living in a territory and subject to a government. Thus an exceptional threat to the life of the nation implies that, some or all of the features that constitute statehood (territory, population and government) should be threatened. It is suggested that a threat to the life of the nation is one that on the one hand affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of the territory of the state, and on the other hand, threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political independence or the territorial integrity of the state or the existence or basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the rights recognised in the Covenant (UN ECOSOC 1984: para. 29 7).
With regard to Cameroon, the idea of exceptional in emergency matters is highly questionable.
Indeed, between the colonial period and 1992 the country has recorded more than one hundred decrees of declaration of a state of emergency (Atemengue 1999:146) and these only reflect the cases that were declared as such, as provided for by local and international legislation on that matter. A step back in the fifties during the struggle for independence shows that French authorities and their local collaborators notably Ahmadou Ahidjo repeatedly implemented draconian measures to retaliate against nationalist tendencies. In so doing emergency decrees A state of emergency may be declared on the part or entire part of the national territory either: 14 14 -in case of an occurrence which by its nature and gravity is deemed a national disaster;
-in case of a series of disturbances undermining public order or the security of the state; or -in case of foreign aggression.
Looking closely at these provisions, it is worth highlighting some important points: Firstly, the concept "national disaster" has no clear meaning and no criteria at all. The jurisprudence has attempted to clarify this concept. Since the Rhodes case, it is assumed that the concept "national disaster" refers to a natural cataclysm, such as a volcanic eruption (Conseil d"Etat 18 Mai 1983 Rhodes). 9 In the Rhodes case the judge admitted exceptional circumstances in a situation where in 1976 the Préfet of Guadeloupe undertook drastic measures to prevent the eruption of a volcano called la Soufrière.
Secondly, the concept "disturbances undermining public order or state security or foreign invasion" are also characterised by a lack of precision. Any fact or event even vested with legal attributes may in certain cases be considered as a threat to public order or state"s security. The reason is that the "expression ""state security"" is general and refers to both the internal and external security of the state as one can hardly be defined without the other." (Nforbin 1998: 68) This was ruled in a case where the court acknowledged exceptional circumstances following a strike by civil servants in November 1938 (Conseil d"Etat 18 Avril 1947Jarrigon). The notion "state security" is not part of public law lexicon, which rather refers to the concept "public safety" (Nforbin 1998: 68) . Indeed "state security" belongs to the penal law vocabulary and is characterised by repressive measures, whereas public safety is characterised by preventive measures. In Cameroon if the main legislation to deal with the concept of "state security" is the penal code, it is worth mentioning that this concept is yet to be defined. English version rather refers to "foreign invasion." English and French being the two official languages of Cameroon and having the same authoritative status, 11 it is not clear whether the law refers to foreign aggression or foreign invasion. For example, if it is assumed that Cameroon law refers to "foreign invasion", the concept will still lack precision, for it is subject to controversy. Common to these institutions in most countries is the fact that the discretionary power of those who declare an emergency cannot be challenged. It is they who determine whether an emergency exists and what measures are deemed necessary to cope with it (Neumann 1953:917) .
Instead of assessing and identifying the conditions of declaration of a state of emergency, the president in Cameroon is vested with "special powers as may be provided for by the law." Thus everyone has no other choice but to trust the presidential interpretation in that matter. As it is currently argued:
In Cameroon to know if an occurrence amounts to a national disaster or not is easy at constitutional level. If the president of the republic calls it a national disaster, then it is one (Nforbin 1998: 66) .
This statement is in connection with the presidential declaration of a state of emergency in the capital city Yaounde following the failed coup d"état of 6 April 1984. After acknowledging a "complete victory" by loyal forces, the resumption of normal activities and the calm that prevailed all over the national territory, President Biya unexpectedly enforced a state of emergency on 18 April, nearly two weeks following the attempted coup. Such a situation leads to the question to know whether an attempted coup d"état could be included in the events considered as "exceptional threat to the life of the nation" or "circumstances so warrant" to the nation"s territorial integrity. As a response "the commentary to the draft guidelines for the development of legislation on states of emergency suggests that even serious disruption of the organised life community would not constitute sufficient grounds for a state of emergency if the 
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Cameroon experience attests to the fact that compliance with the principle of proclamation and notification are questionable. The outcome of the controversial presidential elections on 12
October 1992, which resulted in the defeat of the opposition, led to crackdown and uprisings in some areas of the country. Gross violation of human rights and drastic security measures were deployed. Political leaders, especially the head of the opposition party, were placed under housearrest. People came to realise that the north-west province, the stronghold of the main opposition party was under a state of emergency. The peculiarity of such a situation lies in the fact that a state of emergency that submerged the north-west province was never proclaimed officially, as provided for by law. Indeed, within the Cameroon context and from a legal perspective, a state of emergency must be declared by a "presidential decree." 14 In this situation, the information was simply read on television on the evening of 27 0ctober 1992.
Connecting this event with the principle of proclamation of public emergency, as required by the Covenant, it is hardly difficult to exclude any idea of failure of law in that matter. 1998: 64) . On 18 January 1996, the constitution was amended and the emergency provisions were to be released this time with two paragraphs instead of three as had always been the case in the previous constitutions. The former third paragraph on the proclamation was merely cut and pasted at the end of the second paragraph on the state of siege. Therefore, one of the interpretations could be that the proclamation would only be limited to a state of siege and would no longer concern a state of emergency.
The principle of non-discrimination
This principle is emphasized by section 4(1) of the Covenant which mentions that certain discrimination clauses may not be imposed in a manner that discriminates solely on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. The adjective "solely" in the text raised some controversial issues on the nature of discrimination itself. Notwithstanding it is suggested that even without this term, the reference to discrimination in section 4 conveys the implication that only arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions in the application of emergency measures would be outlawed (Fitspatrick 1994: 63) .
In Cameroon the constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, and religion. Thus, where an identifiable racial or religious group poses a distinct security threat not posed by other members of the community, presumably, emergency measures could be deliberately targeted against the group, despite the non-discrimination clause (Fitspatrick 1994: 63) .
The principle of non-derogable rights
The principle of non-derogable appears in section 4(2) of the Covenant which mentions that "no derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision." This refers to the right to life, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery or to be held in servitude, imprisonment on the grounds of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation, arbitrary detention, right to recognition everywhere as 19 19 a person before the law, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Non-derogable rights refer to those rights attached to human beings and which cannot be subject to limitation by states, even during emergency situations. 17 It was reported that the drafters of the Covenant touched on the basic issue when defining whether non-derogable rights should proceed from the perspective of identifying those rights most vital to human integrity and most likely during abusive emergencies, or whether those rights should include all provisions whose suspension could not conceivably be necessary during times of public emergency (Fitspatrick 1994: 64) . Similarly, the Convention against torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment underlines this principle in its non-derogable clause provided by section 2(2) which reads:
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
This section expressly targets emergency situations which most of the time are deemed a legal excuse for torture and other gross violation of human rights. The state"s experience of an emergency is irrelevant by virtue of non-derogability of the prohibition on torture, but committee against torture"s reviews are likely to be influenced by the frequent association of widespread torture practices with public emergencies (Fitspatrick 1994:113) . It is reported that the ten Torture is without a doubt a speedy process to obtain confessions or information; to convince a man to bear the responsibility of a crime and to have some guarantee that he will adhere to this responsibility upon his release from the police premises. The most efficient way is to show him that his guilt is logically compelling, and that all overwhelm him; that he is insane to persist denying the evidence (Fenkam 2003: 166) .
This quotation reflects the climate within the prisons of the country before and after the alleged 
Conclusion
This paper aimed at assessing the international standards on emergency regimes through the lens of the Cameroon experience. These international standards essentially from a treaty based system are located inside a set of international instruments and are compulsory among state parties. The paper shows a significant inadequacy between the Cameroon emergency system and the principles laid down by international instruments. The country hardly complies with the principles of proportionality, exceptional threat, non-derogable rights, notification, nondiscrimination and good faith motivation. As a result, rather than being mere derogations, it can be said that emergency regimes in Cameroon materialise in a complete legal vacuum and are therefore to be considered as failures of law.
As suggestion, firstly the institutions of emergency regimes need to be entirely redesigned with details clarification. Secondly, the presidential act of declaration of a state of emergency should no longer be considered as an act of state vested with judicial immunity. The president should no longer be the only entity involved in the enforcement of such regimes; in other words, Parliament and the Judiciary should be granted a place of choice in emergency matter. Thirdly the mechanism of national and international supervision of the management of emergency situations should be reinforced in order to enhance some accountability process. 3 For example, following the controversial presidential elections of 1992, a state of emergency was imposed in the North-West region of Cameroon, stronghold of the main opposition party by the president as a response to massive electoral frauds that the current regime was accused of. 4 It seems owners of these motorbikes have been using their engines to transport Boko Haram members throughout the region.
5 Part 2 of the Constitution provide for the executive power, part 3 for the legislative power, and part 5 for the judicial power. Before 1996 only two powers existed within the country, but since the amendment of 18 January 1996, the judicial authority has been emancipated and became the judicial power, even if, as provided by section 37(3), the president of the republic remains the guarantor of the independence of judicial power. 
